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INTRODUCTION
[1]
A sixty year-old man is delighted when his son shows him how to
use Pandora—an interactive, hip Internet radio site that puts the listener in
control.1 Having grown up a huge Louis Armstrong fan, the man quickly
selects the jazz singer as one of his “stations.”2 When listening to this
station, Pandora will only play songs by Armstrong and other similar
artists for him.3 When he hears Armstrong’s classic, “What a Wonderful
World,” the man immediately clicks the “Thumbs Up” icon, indicating his

∗

J.D., cum laude, University of Michigan Law School, 2009; B.S., Cornell University,
2006. Many people assisted me throughout this process. Professor Jessica Litman
provided invaluable suggestions and feedback. Attorneys Christian Castle and David
Oxenford generously offered their expertise. A special thank you to my girlfriend, Lucy
Muzzy, and my best friend, Michael Zuckerman, for their help and, perhaps more
importantly, for their love and support.

1

See generally Pandora Radio, Frequently Asked Questions, http://blog.pandora.com/faq/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
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Id.
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Id.
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approval of Pandora’s recommendation.4 Pandora’s recommendations are
drawn from its “Music Genome Project,” a database of song attributes that
has been compiled by an army of professional musicologists.5 Pandora’s
musicologist have analyzed and identified the attributes of “What a
Wonderful World” and use this knowledge to recommend other songs for
a listener.6 In addition, Pandora further tailors its recommendations based
on the choices other listeners have made.7 In the end, the man’s refined
playlist contains a variety of artists, from jazz standards like Peggy Lee to
new jazz artists, like Betty Carter. Pandora is extremely interactive, but it
does not allow the man to download or skip through too many songs.8
[2]
Reading the morning news and listening to Pandora each morning
has left the man longing for catchy songs when he takes his stroll in the
evening. Once again his son has a solution and gets his father an iPod for
his birthday. After explaining how to use it, the son suggests to his father
to load the iPod with songs the man enjoys listening to on Pandora. The
son tells his father to simply click on the song and follow the link to
iTunes. The man is marveled by the ease of the transaction to download
the song. He continues exploring iTunes, filling out a few reviews and
previewing some of iTunes’ recommendations before downloading a few
more songs. Before now, the man was just a casual music listener, too
busy to spend hours shopping for complete albums on Compact Disc (CD)
and too impatient to put up with the radio’s incessant commercials and
talking, not to mention all the songs he is not interested in hearing.
Pandora and iTunes have eliminated the transaction costs and the noise
that stood in the way of the man becoming a regular music listener and
customer.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.
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[3]
While this story may suggest that the marriage of music and the
Internet has been uncontroversial, the reality is a bit more complicated.
For one, the ease with which songs can be exchanged online has facilitated
digital music piracy.9 And there are also the self-interested grievances
from those who are not particularly excited about digital music: the
recording industry, which has watched CD sales decline,10 and traditional
radio broadcasters that now have to compete with the likes of Pandora.11
It is the latter which is the subject of this article.
[4]
Both the copyright laws that apply to digital transmissions and the
relationships within the music industry are complicated. While one can
say with certainty that most music artists are paid when Pandora plays
their copyrighted work or when someone pays to download a song from
iTunes, how much they receive is a legal question loaded with numerous
practical considerations. Before answering this question, it is worth
considering the context in which the question is being asked. To that end,
Part I of this article traces the major developments in the digital revolution
that have set the table for future battles. Part II explains the scheme set up
by copyright law that regulates digital performances and sales of music
online, tracking who exactly is paid when a song is downloaded or
transmitted over the Internet. Part III of this article discusses the ongoing
struggles of the recording industry with digital marketplaces and Internet
radio, and predicts the battles that will make headlines in 2010, arguing
that the law should be more conscious of accounting for the public interest
that is derived from these emerging technologies.

9

See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(citing S. REP. 105-190, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (“Due to the ease with which
digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously,
copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet
without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy.”)).
10

Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of
Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 737-38 (2005)
(summarizing the decline of U.S. music industry revenue).
11

Nick Madigan, Competition Abounds for Radio; MP3 Players, Satellite Challenge
Conventional Version of Medium, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 1A (Dec, 15, 2005).
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I. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION
[5]
The trouble for the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) began in the late 1990s with the birth of peer-to-peer file sharing.
To combat declining CD sales caused by digital music piracy over peer-topeer networks, the RIAA began suing individual file-sharers. That
campaign failed. The RIAA has developed a new strategy that is
beginning to take shape—a focus on maximizing royalty payments from
Internet sources. One immediate consequence of this new effort is the
threat of extinction for Internet radio.
[6]
At its peak in 1999, the recording industry was growing at an
annual rate of six percent and had total profits of $14.6 billion.12 But the
turning point for the recording industry occurred in June 1999, when an
undergraduate student at Northeastern University released the original
version of Napster.13 A year after Napster’s launch, CD sales began to
suffer a continuous decline, plunging six percent in 2001, followed by
another nine percent in 2002 and seven percent more in 2003.14 Most
teenagers can tell you how the RIAA eventually took down Napster’s
network, but its roughly forty million users did not sign off—they simply
migrated to other file-sharing services.15 According to Hilliary Rosen, the
former CEO of the RIAA, the migration that occurred between 2001 and
2003 was when they “lost the users.”16

12

Mike Wiser, Frequently Asked Questions, FRONTLINE, May
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/music/inside/faqs.html.

27,

2004,

13

Napster’s High and Low Notes, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_33/b3694003.htm.

14

See Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry’s Decline, ROLLING STONE, June
28, 2007, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/15137581/the_record_
industrys_decline.
15

See id.

16

Id.
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[7]
In 2003, the recording industry took its fight to the courtroom.17
Without waiting for a federal appellate court to decide whether an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) must provide the identities of its subscribers, the
RIAA filed its first lawsuits against college students, alleging copyright
infringement for sharing music over peer-to-peer networks.18 By the end
of the year, the recording industry had filed hundreds of lawsuits and
issued hundreds more federal subpoenas to users of file-sharing
networks.19 In response to the holding of the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) did not
require an ISP to comply with its subpoenas, the RIAA commenced a
campaign of John Doe actions.20 While the campaign began with a growl
in 2003,21 it ended with a whimper five years later.22 Ironically, 2003 was

17

See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Groster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (describing that movie and recording industries sued peer-to-peer media
transfer network software providers for copyright infringement); In re Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.C. 2003) (describing that the recording industry suit
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act seeking identity of anonymous ISP users
who allegedly infringed copyrights).
18

See Peter Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 660
(2005) (“[a]lthough the lawsuits raised public awareness of the illegality of online file
trading, the recording industry soon found itself confronted with bad publicity and harsh
criticism. In less than a month, the labels settled with the students, each of whom agreed
to pay damages that ranged from $12,000 to $17,500.”).

19

See Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: The Overview; 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1; Hundreds of Subpoenas in Net Piracy,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 19, 2003, at A3, available at http://community.seattletimes.
nwsource.com/archive/?date=20030719&slug=ndig19.
20

See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
that a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP storing infringing data, and not ISPs that
facilitate peer-to-peer file sharing); Yu, supra note 18, at 674-75 (stating that the effect of
the circuit court’s ruling made the RIAA’s litigation strategy more cumbersome: it would
have to file John Doe actions against file-sharers, unable to weed out sympathetic
defendants, and disclosure of information would only be provided for a pending lawsuit).

21

See Jefferson Graham, Swap Songs? You May Be on Record Industry’s Hit List, USA
TODAY, July 22, 2003, at 1D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-0721-swappers_x.htm.
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also the year Apple launched its own response to illegal music file
sharing—the now successful iTunes Store.23
[8]
While the Napster litigation was underway, several recording
industry executives secretly met with Hank Barry, the CEO of Napster.24
At the July 2000 meeting, the executives attempted to strike a licensing
deal with Napster that would allow its users to keep downloading songs
for a monthly subscription fee, but an agreement was never reached.25
According to Rosen: “The record companies needed to jump off a cliff,
and they couldn’t bring themselves to jump.”26
Today the story is
equally revealing. People are listening to more music, while the recording
industry has fewer and fewer customers.27 Part of the problem for the
recording industry is that the steady increase in digital transactions has not
made up for plummeting CD sales,28 leading many to doubt the continuing
22

See Yu, supra note 18, at 663 (noting that the RIAA celebrated the subpoena power it
won in the district court by launching a mass-litigation campaign against file-swappers);
Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J. Dec.
19, 2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html;
Nate Anderson, No More Lawsuits: ISPs to Work With RIAA, Cut Off P2P Users, ARS
TECHNICA, Dec. 19, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/12/no-morelawsuits-isps-to-work-with-riaa-cut-off-p2p-users.ars.
23

See Laurie J. Flynn, Apple Offers Music Downloads with Unique Pricing, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2003, at C2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/29/business/
technology-apple-offers-music-downloads-with-unique-pricing.html.
See generally
Apple iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited Sept. 10, 2009) (providing
information on the features of iTunes Store, for example, to purchase and download
music.).

24

See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 14.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

See id.

28

RIAA KEY STATISTICS: 2007 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS (2007),
http://76.74.24.142/81128FFD-028F-282E-1CE5-FDBF16A46388.pdf (showing that CD
sales hit their peak in 2000, and have declined each year through 2007, with digital sales
having a 59% increase in 2006 and 38% increase in 2007).
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vitality of the RIAA’s current business model.29 Equally troubling for the
industry is the apparent desertion of its traditional partners. Computer and
consumer electronics groups’ interests have begun to diverge from the
RIAA.30 Senators have balked at the RIAA’s strong-arm tactics of
enforcement.31 Even Mickey Mouse, “the protagonist of the copyright
term extension drama,” is not happy.32

29

See, e.g., Alvin Chan, The Chronicles of Grokster: Who Is the Biggest Threat In the
P2P Battle?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 291, 323 (2008) (“the most sensible solution
requires the music industry to make the long-overdue admission that just like vinyl
records and cassette tapes, the days of the simple compact disc are over. The longanticipated transition from physical to ethereal music might finally be upon us, since the
advent of new media has rendered record stores increasingly obsolete.”); Tim Arango,
Digital Sales Surpass CDs At Atlantic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/business/media/26music.html; Mark Hefflinger,
Report: Digital Music Download Sales to Pass CD Sales by 2012, DIGITAL MEDIA Wire,
Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2008/02/19/report:-digital-musicdownload-sales-pass-cd-sales-2012.
30

See Yu, supra note 18, at 683-84 (stating that although they were former allies pushing
for the DMCA legislation, the interests of the RIAA and consumer electronics have
begun to diverge; having to pay more to copyright holders as a result of the way the
DMCA has been interpreted, consumers have less to spend on new technology.
Furthermore, copyright industries like the RIAA have been lobbying Congress to protect
their royalty schemes, which has in turn stifled the development of new technologies).

31

See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Efforts to Stop Music Swapping Draw More Fire, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2003, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/01/business/
01MUSI.html (describing Senator Coleman’s remark, “[i]f you're taking someone else's
property, that's wrong, that's stealing. . . . But in this country we don't cut off people's
hands when they steal. One question I have is whether the penalty here fits the crime.”);
Grant Gross, Congress Scrutinizes RIAA Tactics, PC WORLD, Sept. 17, 2003,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/112535/congress_scrutinizes_riaa_tactics.html (stating
that Senators Brownback, Wyden, and Coleman have criticized RIAA’s use of the
DMCA subpoenas).
32

Yu, supra note 18, at 680 (“[e]ven Mickey Mouse, the protagonist of the copyright
term extension drama, could not help but give an interview blasting his owner: For
almost 70 years, I've only been allowed to do what the Disney people say I can do.
Sometimes someone comes up with a new idea, and I think to myself, ‘Great! Here's a
chance to stretch myself!’ But of course they won't let me leave the reservation. If I do,
they send out their lawyers to bring me home . . . Do you have any idea what it's like to
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[9]
Having recently given up on suing individuals,33 the recording
industry is now intent on squeezing out royalty payments from new
sources of music.34 Unfortunately, Internet radio may soon become a
casualty of RIAA’s fresh strategy. While affordable, high-speed Internet
access was unheard of in the early 1990s.35 as technology has developed,
online broadcasting has grown into itself and enjoys considerable
popularity today.36 Indeed, more than a quarter of Americans have
listened to Internet radio,37 with Pandora alone claiming twenty million
registered listeners.38 Pandora’s listeners have access to more than
600,000 songs, many of which are performed by artists who would
otherwise have no access to a steady audience.39 And Pandora provides its

have to greet kids at Disneyland every single day, always smiling, never slipping off for a
cigarette?”).
33

See McBride & Smith, supra note 22; Anderson, supra note 22.

34

See Posting of Tim Westergren to Pandora Blog, http://blog.pandora.com/pandora/
archives/2007/03/riaas_new_royal.html (Mar. 6, 2007, 00:49 EST) (commenting by the
founder of Pandora that RIAA’s struggle has nothing to do with internet radio’s business
model).
35

See John Markoff, Turning the Desktop PC Into a Talk Radio Medium, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1993, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/04/us/turning-thedesktop-pc-into-a-talk-radio-medium.html; Joshua, Quittner, Radio Free Cyberspace,
TIME, May 1, 1995, at 91, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,982874-1,00.html.
36

See Olga Kharif, The Last Days of Internet Radio?, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2007/tc20070307_
534338.htm.
37

American Media Services Survey Shows Popularity of Internet Radio, Even as Regular
Radio Continues Holding its Audience, AMS NEWS, Apr. 8, 2009, http://american
mediaservices.blogspot.com/2009/04/american-media-services-survey-shows.html.
38

Erick Schonfeld, Pandora Hits 20 Million Registered Users, TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 19,
2008, http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/12/19/pandora-hits-20-million-registered-usersvia-twitter (stating that of the registered users, 40 percent have been recently active).

39

See Pandora, CRUNCHBASE, http://www.crunchbase.com/company/pandora (last
visited Sept. 10, 2009). Each of these songs is “digitally annotated with musical
characteristics from a list of 400. Pandora differs from its competitors in the personalized
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service with limited commercial interruptions.40 Adding to the excitement
of online broadcasting are the recent introductions of Internet-ready, ultrapopular iPhone and iPod Touch, which have effectively given rise to
portable webcasting.41
[10] Years before webcasting emerged as a reliable medium, Congress
threw the recording industry a bone. Largely through their lobbying
efforts, traditional radio broadcasters have been able to keep sound
recording owners (usually the record labels) from having exclusive
performance rights in copyrighted works.42 But the RIAA, with its own
army of lobbyists, fought against this exemption.43 In 1995, the National
Association of Broadcasters sought to handicap the potential competitor it
saw in webcasters by joining with the RIAA to lobby for a limited
performance right of sound recording owners—limited because it would
apply only to digital transmissions.44

music that it delivers; with recommendations tailored to individual users by musicians
rather by other users, Pandora delivers a unique experience. Id
40

Jason Kincaid, Pandora Radio Starts Serving Audio Ads, TECHCRUNCH, Jan. 20, 2009,
http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/01/20/pandora-radio-starts-serving-audio-ads.
The
audio advertisements are an addition to the image-based ones that Pandora has always
employed. So far the audio commercials are sparse, and have not yet been implemented
on the iPhone version of Pandora. Id.
41

See Jeremy Horwitz, iPhone Gems: 12 Internet Radio Apps for iPhone + iPod Touch
(Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/articles/comments/iphone-gems-12internet-radio-apps-for-iphone-ipod-touch (noting that Apple has added Pandora as an
application for its iPhone and iPod Touch).
42

Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board’s March
2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 265-67 (2008).
43

See id.

44

Id.
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[11] The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995
(DPRA) provided that this limited right would operate alongside
traditional copyright protection of music.45 In 1998, Congress amended
the DPRA when it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).46 The DMCA eliminated the exemption for performances that
occur as part of “[a] nonsubscription transmission other than a
retransmission,” leaving webcasters clearly subject to royalty payments.47
[12] More importantly, the Copyright Royalty Board has led to the
establishment of rates that have sent many webcasters spinning out of
business or, at the very least, depressed about their prospects for
survival.48 Because the recording industry remains skeptical about the
potential revenue stream from Internet radio, negotiations over royalty
payments for the digital performance right may not have yielded fair
results.49 Indeed, as discussed in further detail below, whether the DPRA
allows webcasters to sustain a profitable business model remains to be
seen.50

45

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006)).

46

Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512).
47

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, supra note 34, §
114(d)(1)(A)(i), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).

48

See, e.g., Ben Newhouse, Senate Committee Testimony of Tim Westergren of Pandora
Media, ROYALTYWEEK, Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.royaltyweek.com/?p=53. See
generally Copyright Royalty Board, http://www.loc.gov/crb (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).

49

See Paul Maloney, Evaluating NAB/SoundEx Deal: Good Business, or Disaster?,
RADIO AND INTERNET NEWSL. Mar. 2, 2009, http://textpattern.kurthanson.com/articles/
614/rain-32-evaluating-nabsoundex-deal-good-business-or-disaster (quoting industry
expert Bob Bellin that “[as a result of the settlement] webcasters must pay a much bigger
percentage of their revenue to the labels than what was the original calculus”).
50

See Posting of Marc Fisher to The Washington Post, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
rawfisher/2007/06/day_of_silence_internet_radio.html (June 26, 2007, 07:05 EST)
(stating that a “day of silence” staged by many webcasters, including Pandora, protesting
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II. DIGITAL MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT LAW
[13] Copyright law has its roots in the Constitution,51 and its policy is
carried out by the statutory scheme set up by the Copyright Act.52 This
section begins by discussing the general goals of copyright law that affect
the specific provisions of the Act addressed throughout the article.53
[14] Copyright protection of music is complicated for two reasons: (1)
it involves multiple parts to multiple rights (interests); and (2) influences a
whole host of players in the music industry. In a simplified world, a
performer would write and record his own song and then collect all the
royalties whenever that song is played or purchased. But in its current
form, the Copyright Act establishes distinct interests in each song that may
be held by several individuals.
[15] The practical effect of owning a specific copyright, however, may
not necessarily lead to direct or full payments to the owner. Following an
explanation of the copyright scheme, this section will describe the trails
that follow each interest to the eventual royalty payment. Concluding this
section is a brief look at the two most popular ways of accessing music on
the Internet: streaming and downloading. Since different interests may be
at stake, depending on the method of transmitting a song, whether and
how much an artist or songwriter is paid depends on how a user chooses to
listen to music.
A. THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
[16] Contrary to popular belief, the primary goal of copyright protection
is not necessarily to maximize the rewards for the creator; rather, it is to

the royalty rates determined by the Copyright Royalty Board in 2007 for the digital
performance right in sound recordings).
51

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

52

See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

53

See id. § 102.
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enrich the public domain. Of course, any discussion of the purpose of
copyright law begins with the Constitution. But it is through the
Copyright Act that the Supreme Court has teased out the aim of the
protections granted by the law.
[17] The goals of copyright law in the United States are set out in the
intellectual property clause of the Constitution: “To promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts.”54 To meet those goals, the clause
empowers Congress to provide legislation that secures exclusive rights
“for limited times to Authors and Inventors . . . to their Writings and
Discoveries.”55 Federal law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is in
line with the Constitution: “the scheme established by the Copyright Act .
. . [fosters] the original works that provide the seed and substance of [the
harvest of knowledge].”56 Therefore, while the “rights conferred by
copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a
fair return for their labors,”57 the protection is in fact employed for two
reasons: “to motivate the creative activity of authors;”58 and to enrich the
public domain.59 The Supreme Court has further collapsed these twin
goals by stating that the sole interest and ultimate aim of copyright law
lies “in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.”60
[18] Applying these principles to the music business, the law should be
careful in balancing the public’s interest in having access to music with
the protections given to artists, songwriters and their agents. In other

54

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

55

Id.

56

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985).

57

Id. at 546 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).

58

Id.

59

Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156.

60

Id.
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words, while artists need to be sufficiently incentivized with the promise
of royalty payments, high rewards may detract from the distribution of
their songs, be it through sale or broadcasting. Therefore, the perfectly
crafted laws and statutory rates would give no more to the artist than
needed to sustain his level of motivation.61
B. RIGHTS INVOLVED IN A SALE OF MUSIC
1. THE PERFORMANCE AND MUSICAL WORK LAYERS OF A SONG
[19] Copyright law has created a scheme where the performance and
reproduction of a given song implicates four distinct interests, any of
which may be separately vested in individuals or entities. To begin with,
every song has two layers of copyrightable protection.62 A songwriter
usually composes the “musical work” layer with notes and lyrics.63
Stacked on top of this is the “sound recording” layer, which is the actual
performance of the musical work by an artist, fixed in a digital file or a
CD.64 For instance, Daniel Jones and Darren Hayes, two English
61

See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397,
423-24 (2003) (arguing that consumer’s interest in access to digital information should be
carefully weighed against the incentives given to copyright owners so that the law does
not over-incentivize); see also Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability
of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 589 (1997) (arguing that to
address the concern underproduction of useful works, copyright law grants the author a
limited statutory monopoly by conferring on him certain exclusive rights; without
limitations these rights would inhibit copyright law’s goal of maintaining the free flow of
information on which creativity is built); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 335 (1989) (“too much
protection can raise the costs of creation for subsequent authors to the point where those
authors cannot cover them”).

62

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2006).

63

While there is usually more than one person who “writes” a song, traditionally there
was a writer of the music and a lyricist. Today, rap and hip-hop music demands artists
who create tracks or background rhythm. And royalties for the songwriter are shared
among all these individuals. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 266 (Free Press 2006) (1991).
64

17 U.S.C. § 101 (“sound recordings”).

13

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

musicians, wrote the song “Truly Madly Deeply.”65 It has been a hit,
performed by both the Australian pop duo Savage Garden and the German
Eurodance group Cascada.66 Because the performing artists of the song
are different, when a user downloads a file capturing either performance,
only the musical work layer stays constant.
[20] The two layers in turn give rise to the four separate interests
relevant to this discussion. Among other privileges, the copyright holder
possesses the exclusive right to reproduce and perform his work.67 As a
result, copyright law recognizes an interest in reproducing a musical
work,68 reproducing a sound recording,69 performing a musical work,70
and most recently, in publically performing a sound recording by digital
audio transmission.71
2. THE REPRODUCTION RIGHT
[21] When a user reproduces any track—which, in the digital world,
means he copies or downloads a file to his computer72—he takes the

65

See Savage Garden Biography, http://www.legacyrecordings.com/savage-garden.aspx
(last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
66

See id.; Cascada Biography, http://www.cascada-music.de/v2/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=32 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009);
Cascada Discography Singles Truly Madly Deeply, http://www.cascada-music.de/
v2/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=9&Itemid=48&lang=de (last
visited Sept. 15, 2009).

67

17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (4), (6).

68

Id. § 106(1).

69

Id.

70

Id. § 106(4).

71

Id. § 106(6).

72

See e.g. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that software stored in RAM constitutes a fixed copy protected under the
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musical work and the sound recording together. Consequently, the
reproduction right implicates copyright holders of both layers of the song.
[22] There is a twist when it comes to the reproduction right involving
musical works: the compulsory mechanical license.73 Once the owner of a
musical work permits or licenses someone to use his work as a layer in
any song he makes publicly available, others may use that musical work
so long as they follow the compulsory license requirements.74 One of
these requirements is paying the statutory rate established by the
Copyright Office.75 Significantly, the rate is determined using a standard
set forth in § 801(b)(1).76 Aside from fairness to the copyright owner, it is
significant because, the factors under § 801(b)(1) include the public
interest as well as the impact royalties may have on the “industries
involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.”77 As discussed

Copyright Act from infringement in the absence of ownership of the copyright or
permission by license).
73

See generally 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (“[s]cope of exclusive rights in nondramatic
musical works: Compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords”).
74

Id. § 115(a). Several conditions must be met: the song is a non-dramatic musical work;
and it has been previously recorded; and the previous recording has been distributed
publicly in phonorecords (CDs) or through a digital phonorecord delivery; the recording
doesn’t change the basic melody or fundamental character of the song; the use of
recording will be in phonorecords or DPDs only, for distribution to the public for private
use. Id.
75

Id. § 115(c)(3)(D).

76

Id. § 115(c)(3)(D)(ii) (stating that Copyright Royalty Judges may also consider rates
and terms reached under voluntary license agreements)
77

Id. § 801(b)(1) (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the functions of the
Copyright Royalty Judges shall be as follows: (1) To make determinations and
adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments as provided in sections
112(e), 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, and 1004. The rates applicable under sections
114(f)(1)(B), 115, and 116 shall be calculated to achieve the following objectives: (A) To
maximize the availability of creative works to the public. (B) To afford the copyright
owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the copyright user a fair income under
existing economic conditions. (C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and
the copyright user in the product made available to the public with respect to relative
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below, this standard has been considered for determining rates in other
contexts.
[23] For example, the group Cascada need not have approached Daniel
Jones or Darren Hayes to perform their song “Truly Madly Deeply,” they
just had to have paid the statutory rate. Note that a compulsory license
does not extend to the actual performance fixed in a sound recording. So
anyone who is enamored by Cascada’s voice and wants to reproduce her
version of the song, needs permission from the owner of the sound
recording, which as explained below, is probably a major record label.
3. THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT
[24] The right to perform a musical work publicly goes beyond a live
concert.78 Traditionally, an owner of a sound recording copyright has not
enjoyed an exclusive right to perform his work publicly.79 This partially
changed in 1995, when Congress granted a limited performance right to
owners of sound recordings—the digital transmission performance right
(DTPR)80—while preserving an exemption for conventional, terrestrial
AM/FM radio stations.81 In fact, it is assumed that every time an Internet
radio station transmits a song to a listener, it is performing that work

creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and
contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their
communication. (D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries
involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.”)
78

Id. § 101 (providing definitions of “perform” and “publicly”).

79

Id. § 106(4).

80

Id. § 106(6).

81

See id. § 114(d)(1). Note that “exemption” may not be the best word here because
Congress granted the performance right in sound recording for the first time and only for
digital performances. Traditional radio is exempted in the sense that the right, fairly or
not, only applies to internet radio. In any event, “exemption” is the way most
commentators and legislators have continued to describe broadcast radio’s status with
respect to the performance right in sound recordings.
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publicly.82 It is worth noting that Representative Conyers recently
introduced a bill in to Congress that would remove this exemption by
applying the right to terrestrial broadcasters, albeit with some
limitations.83
[25] Three years after granting the DTPR, and at the insistence of the
RIAA, Congress clarified that webcasters are subject to the digital
performance right when it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).84 As it stands today, the DMCA provides holders of sound
82

Id. (providing the definition of “transmit”). Note that this conclusion need not follow
from the language of the statute. Under § 106, webcasters are clearly either performing
or distributing the music when they transmit songs over the internet. All the players
involved seem to have concluded that webcasters are performing music rather than
distributing it. This is evidence from the fact that the entities collecting royalties from
internet radio are licensed to collect for public performances (for example, collective
rights societies as opposed to the Harry Fox Agency). Indeed, SoundExchange was
designated by the Copyright Office “to collect and distribute digital performance
royalties” for digital audio transmissions of sound recordings, while ASCAP and BMI
collect royalties for the performances of musical works.
See SoundExchange
Background, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2009);
SoundExchange: Future of Music Coalition, http://www.futureofmusic.org/
article/soundexchange (explaining that BMI and ASCAP collect royalties for webcasters’
performances of musical works) (last visited Sept. 15, 2009). But see Cartoon Network
v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that when a customer
requests a movie to be played on his television from a remote storage location, that is not
a public performance).
83

H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); see also Matthew DelNero, Long Overdue? 6
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 181, 196 (2004) (predicting that imposition of this right would
not cause a great financial burden on radios); Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters,
NAB Statement on Today’s Comments From Chairman Boucher (Mar. 31, 2009),
available at http://www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=News_Room&TEMPLATE
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=14240
(responding
to
Congressman
Boucher’s suggestion that broadcasters should accept that there will be a performance
royalty for sound recordings and should therefore negotiate for the rate; pointing out the
promotional benefits of airtime and Congressional support it has for a resolution against a
performance royalty).
84

See Carey, supra note 42, at 270-71. See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
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recording copyrights an exclusive right to perform the work “by means of
a digital audio transmission.”85 The DMCA further qualified the DTPR
through categories that reflect the manner in which songs may be
transmitted online.86 Consequently, an interactive service that plays songs
on-demand must negotiate with the sound recording copyright owner of
the performance right.87 The non-interactive family is divided into
different subcategories.88 Internet radio generally falls within the
subcategory that is eligible for a compulsory license, which it may obtain
through a procedure similar to the one implicated in receiving a
compulsory license for the reproduction of a musical work.89 The two
licenses, however, are distinct, with payments often going to unrelated
organizations.
C. WHO GETS THE MONEY AND HOW MUCH?
1. FOR THE REPRODUCTION RIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS—
ARTIST’S AND LABEL’S TAKE
[26] Most performing artists contract with record labels to produce their
music.90 The agreement between the label and the artist typically assigns
copyright ownership of the sound recording to the record company in

85

17 U.S.C. § 106(6).

86

See id. §§ 114(j)(3), (5), (7), (9), (12) (noting a respective form of transmission
category).
87

See id. §§ 114(j)(1)-(2); id. § 114(d)(3)(D).

88

See id. §114(j)(6), (7), (8), (11) (describing noninteractive categories as “eligible
nonsubscription transmission,” “new subscription service” and “preexisting subscription
service”).
89

See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC 72 (10th
ed., 2007) (noting that even Pandora, an extremely interactive webcaster, has been
considered non-interactive for the purpose of the statute).

90

P ASSMAN, supra note 63, at 61.
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return for the various services it provides.91 Most major record labels
have many divisions within them that are responsible for, among other
things, marketing the new record.92 Thus, the label will promise the artist
a specific cut of the royalty payments it receives, paying the artist an
amount that is computed based on the price and number of records sold.93
But when all the costs are taken out, the reproduction right of the sound
recording often yields significantly less than ten percent of the wholesale
record price for the artist.94
[27] Record labels also charge performers for the cost of recording an
album, which can range from $100,000 to $500,000.95 A cost that is not
included in the promotional expenses noted above.96 And it is common
practice for artists to pay record producers—individuals responsible for
facilitating the recording process—out of their share.97 Producers receive
around three to four percent of the wholesale price.98 In addition, while
the price of producing CDs is originally borne by the labels, they deduct
these costs from the artist as well.99 This is usually done by subtracting
production expenses (around twenty percent of the suggested retail of the
CD) from the price that the labels use to compute the artist’s royalty

91

See id. at 61-63.

92

Id.

93

See id. at 68-69.

94

Id.

95

Diane Rapaport, How Record Companies Make Money, http://www.music-businessproducer.com/record-companies-money.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).

96

Id.

97

PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 88, 114.

98

Id. at 88.

99

Rapaport, supra note 95.
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payments.100 Therefore, assuming the suggested retail price of a CD is
fifteen dollars, the record label will subtract the three dollars or so in
production costs before calculating the artist’s cut.101
[28] Artists are often rewarded when their records are popular, allowing
for an increase in the artist’s take after a certain number of records are
sold. 102 Depending on name recognition and previous success, artists may
receive between thirteen and twenty percent of the wholesale price of the
record.103 A typical “escalation,” however, is less than one percent of the
rate after about 500,000 to a million albums are sold.104
[29] In the end, the artist sees nowhere near the twenty percent royalty
cut he may expect. So the fifteen-dollar CD of a successful performer,
who had managed to negotiate the generous twenty percent rate, may hope
to receive only $2.28 after paying all the production costs and the
producer. And after paying back any advance the artist may have had to
borrow from the label to pay for recording costs and paying for the
promotional expenses, the artist will find an even smaller reward.105

100

See id. (“[s]ome record companies pay royalties on a percentage (8% to 16%) of the
suggested list retail price (SLRP) less a packaging cost, generally 15% to 25% of the
SLRP”).
101

Id.

102

See PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 86–87.

103

See PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 86–87.

104

Id. at 87.

105

Cf. id. at 78-79 (describing the basic situation of advance and recoupment by the
record company).
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2. FOR THE REPRODUCTION RIGHT IN MUSICAL WORKS—
SONGWRITERS’ TAKE
[30] Songwriters either assign the entirety of their copyrights to
publishers or allow the publisher to administer the compositions.106 In the
latter case, the songwriter splits royalty payments with the publisher down
the middle.107 Publishers serve many useful functions; for example, they
match writers with singers, help them with their writing, and promote
records.108 But publishers are no longer the power holders they once
were.109 This is partly because many major songwriters today have inhouse publishing, and a growing number of artists are writing their own
songs.110
[31] Publishers in turn have “agents,” like the Harry Fox Agency, that
issue mechanical licenses on their behalf.111 For a charge of about 6.75
percent of the money collected, the Harry Fox Agency accounts to the
publisher for the royalties that are being collected.112 This accounting
includes the auditing of record companies in order to accurately allocate
royalty payments among the publishers.113 While in practice labels do not
use the statutory license, the mechanical license that the Harry Fox
Agency issues on behalf of the publishers is usually tied to some
percentage of the statutory rate.114 As a result, songwriters not only have

106

See PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 206-07.

107

Id. at 207-08.

108

Id. at 209.

109

See id.

110

Id.

111

Id. at 213.

112

Id.

113

Id.
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to pay their publishers and the Harry Fox Agency, but also have to settle
for receiving less than the statutory rate promised.115
[32] As previously discussed, anyone who wishes to use a musical work
that has already been captured by a song may do so with a compulsory
mechanical license.116 Intense lobbying by the record companies has kept
the statutory rate for the license decidedly low.117 From 1909 to 1976, the
rate was two cents per record.118 In practice, the compulsory license is
rarely used.119 Nevertheless, the statutory rate is important in setting the
ceiling in any negotiation for mechanical royalty payments.120
[33] The 1976 Copyright Act raised the compulsory license rate to 2.75
cents per record and allowed for further adjustments by the Copyright
Royalty Board (CRB).121 The CRB consists of three judges, holds
hearings to determine the statutory rate, using the “willing buyer/willing
seller” standard.122 More recently, in 2008, the CRB ruled that a rate of

114

Id. at 212 (describing that the rate is usually fixed, meaning that even if the statutory
rate goes up, the rate that the Harry Fox Agency receives stays the same. This fixed rate
can equal the full statutory rate, or at seventy-five percent of it, as record labels generally
ask).

115

See id.

116

Id.

117

See id. at 203.

118

Id.

119

See, e.g., Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intel.l Prop. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (testimony of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights) available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
regstat062105.html (noting that Section 115 has been used simply as a ceiling for the
royalty rate in privately negotiated licenses).
120

See PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 203-04.

121

Id.

122

Carey, supra note 42, at 284-85.
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9.1 cents per song would be effective for the following five years,
regardless of whether customers buy the song as a digital track online or
as a CD in a record store.123 Today, record labels typically try to limit
their payment to about seventy-five percent of the statutory rate, which is
just under seven cents per song sold.124 Therefore, with compulsory
license fees essentially operating as a maximum rate, and with publishers
taking a substantial portion of any royalties, songwriters generally receive
less than five cents for every track sold.125
3. FOR THE DIGITAL PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS—
ARTIST’S AND LABEL’S TAKE.
[34] Royalty payments are collected and distributed by
SoundExchange, the designated non-profit organization for digitally
played recordings that collects license fees and distributes them to the
performer and sound recording copyright owner.126 SoundExchange also
makes payments directly to the record label and the artists,127 dividing
payments using a consistent formula where the record company gets fifty
percent, the featured artist receives forty-five percent, and the remainder
going to unions representing the non-featured musicians and non-featured
vocalists.128 This means that performers not only receive money they
123

Posting to Future Music Blog, http://futuremusic.com/blog/?p=3428 (Oct. 2, 2008,
16:44 EST).

124

See, e.g., id. at 216 (describing that seventy-five percent is the standard that new
artists usually have to settle for; those with bargaining power may get a bit more); Diane
Rapaport, supra note 95.

125

See PASSMAN, supra note 63 at 68-69, 200-01.

126

This is assuming that the artist and record company are in the SoundExchange
database. Digital performance royalties are distributed as long as SoundExchange has the
payee information regardless of membership with SoundExchange. See SoundExchange,
supra note 67.
127

See id.

128

Id. 2.5% to the American Federation of Musicians (AFM) and 2.5% to the American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA).
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would not earn if their song is played over conventional radio (because
terrestrial broadcasters have been exempt from paying a public
performance right for sound recordings), but their cut from a digital
transmission (forty-five percent) is even larger than from a CD purchase
(less than ten percent).129 Additionally, artists who have retained the
copyright in their sound recording get even more money.130
[35] Since royalty payments for digital performances are made directly
to the performer, the newest right created by copyright law earns artists
the biggest cut (fifty percent) but not necessarily the most money.131
Indeed, they receive only a small fraction of a cent for every
performance.132 The CRB also sets these rates, which have been subject to
much controversy. But if Internet radio is able to pay the recently
announced rates, while continuing to grow in popularity, fractions of
pennies may quickly add up to dollars for the artists and their labels.
[36] The CRB has concluded that these rates should replicate the “terms
that would have been negotiated in a hypothetical marketplace,”133 where
the webcaster is the buyer and record company is the seller. The payments
for these “complete repertoire of sound recordings,” however, are
supposed to reflect the “fair market value” of a world without compulsory
licenses.134

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

See
Posting
of
Rashmi
Rangnath
to
Public
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1982 (Feb. 7, 2009, 19:22 EST).

132

Knowledge,

See Future of Music Coalition, Public Performance Right Hearing on the Hill, Mar.
11, 2009, http://futureofmusic.org/blog/2009/03/11/public-performance-right-hearinghill.

133

Id. at 286.

134

Id. at 287.
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[37] The CRB’s first decision, issued in March 2007, set out rates that
even Congress admitted threatened the “survival of webcasting . . . in the
United States.”135 Since then, several groups, including the “Small
Commercial Webcasters” and SoundExchange, have filed appeals in the
D.C. Circuit stemming from the CRB’s 2007 decision.136 These cases
challenged the constitutionality of the CRB and the validity of the rates it
set.137
[38] Congress subsequently passed the Webcaster Settlement Act of
2008, which allowed SoundExchange and webcasters to negotiate royalty
rates to replace those set by the CRB in 2007.138 On March 3, 2009, the
Federal Register published the rates agreed to in the settlement.139
Independent broadcasters, like Pandora, were parties to the negotiation,
but they must file notice with the Register if they would like to rely on the
settlement rates.140 If an independent broadcaster does not file notice, then

135

Id. at 306-07.

136

See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 752
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, http://www.
broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-two-court-of-appeals-arguments-on-soundrecording-music-royalty-rates-and-the-real-question-is-whether-the-copyright-royaltyboard-is-constitutional.html (Mar. 24, 2009, 00:00 EST) [hereinafter Appeals]. The small
webcasters are challenging the board’s rates as too high, while SoundExchange contends
they were set too low. The former are arguing that the board should have adopted a
percentage of revenue standard because anything else would guarantee the webcasters
would be going out of business. Large webcasters challenge the flawed reasoning. In
both cases the “overriding question [is] whether the Judges on the CRB were
constitutionally appointed and thus whether any decisions of the Board had any validity.”
Id.
137

See Appeals.

138

Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(e)(1) (2009).

139

Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, 74 Fed.
Reg. 9293, 9296 (Mar. 3, 2009).
140

See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, http://www.
broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-details-of-the-broadcaster-soundexchangesettlement-on-webcasting-royalties.html (Mar. 7, 2009, 01:55 EST); John Timmer,
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it must pay the rates established by the CRB in 2007.141 In addition,
webcasters must retain the services of one of the companies that attempt to
track performances.142 But small broadcasters may be exempt from this
record-keeping requirement.143
[39] The settlement sets out royalty payments on a per song, per listener
basis.144 For example, if Pandora plays Cascada’s “Truly Madly Deeply”
five times and the song is transmitted to a thousand listeners, there are five
thousand performances.145 The new rates, however, represent modest
savings from the 2007 CRB determination. Although in 2008 webcasters
had to pay fourteen cents, unchanged from the 2007 decision, the
settlement establishes annual rate increases from 2009 to 2015. But the
increases during this period will be gradual when compared with the

Pandora Lives! SoundExchange Cuts Deal on Webcasting Rates, ARS TECHNICA, July 7,
2009,
http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/07/soundexchange-cuts-deal-on-musicwebcasting-rates.ars.
141

See Appeals.

142

Id.

143

Id.; see also Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog,
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-soundexchange-settlementwith-microcasters-a-royalty-option-for-the-very-small-webcaster.html (Mar. 28, 2009,
04:53 EST) (stating that a few of the very small webcasters ($1.25 million in revenue and
5 million monthly aggregate tuning hours) also agreed with SoundExchange to a number
of conditions, the most important of which is the right to pay royalties based on a
percentage of their revenue. The bottom line is that this may not be a fair deal. But “for
small webcasters, this may be the only way that some may be able to stay in business.
Small webcasters will need to surrender some rights to fight the royalties, and will have
to live with the other provisions of the deal, and weigh those downsides against the
opportunity to continue streaming in deciding whether to sign on to this deal by April
30.”).
144

See Appeals.

145

Id.
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increases under the 2007 determination.146 The settlement also preserves a
floor and establishes a ceiling for the rates for each channel: a minimum
annual fee of $500 (the same as under the 2007 decision) and a maximum
fee of $50,000.147
[40] In the end, it is unclear whether the settlement will provide
webcasters with the breathing room they need to grow their industry.148
Consequently, despite the large number of Internet radio listeners, artists
may not see much in terms of royalty payments from their new right.
4. FOR THE PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN MUSICAL WORKS—
SONGWRITERS’ TAKE.
[41] Unlike with reproduction rights, there is no compulsory license for
the performance of music works. As a practical matter, this makes little
difference. While it is difficult to predict how much a songwriter will
receive for each performance because the organizations granting musical
works performance licenses do not do so on an individual basis and vary
royalty rates on factors independent of the artist, the total money collected
for these royalties is substantial.
[42] Collective rights societies, like the two giants, American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI), serve most of the songwriters, paying them directly and bypassing
the publishers.149 For a fee, these collective rights organizations grant
146

Compare Appeals (showing minimal increases in 2008 to 2011 followed by a larger
increase), with Carey, supra note 42, at 290-91 (showing greater increases in 2007 to
2009 followed by a smaller increase).
147

See Appeals; 37 C.F.R. § 380 (2008). An Internet radio channel is usually a category
of music genre or type of artist that the listener chooses. See Steve Gordon, Clearing
Music Recordings and Compositions for Use in Digital Music Services, 12 Ent. L. & Fin.
3 (2002) (describing the variety of music available on Internet radio.).

148

See Appeals.

149

See PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 225; see also
http://www.bmi.com/about/entry/538061 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
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blanket licenses to webcasters for a specific period of time for all the
musical works’ performance rights they own.150 In 2008, ASCAP and
BMI distributed more than $1.3 billion in royalties for approximately
600,000 members,151 which makes for an average payment of $2,500 per
songwriter.
[43] While webcasters that choose the broadest license need to provide
only a minimal amount of tracking, other webcasting licensees must
submit detailed music use data.152 ASCAP, for example, represents over
300,000 songwriters and publishers, and has different licensing rates
depending on the level of activity on a given website and the amount of
income it generates.153 The following illustrates the general steps used by
ASCAP to determine the royalty payment for songwriter.
[44] First, based on where the work has been played, ASCAP calculates
the number of credits the songwriter earned for each performance.154 It
then determines the dollar value of each credit at the end of the year, by
tallying the total money available for distribution, and the number of
credits being processed.155 After deducting operating costs, which for
ASCAP is currently 11.3 percent,156 ASCAP divides the royalties they
150

See PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 225.

151

Ben Newhouse, BMI Retools Network Television Distribution System, ROYALTY
WEEK, Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.royaltyweek.com/?p=49; see ASCAP ANNUAL
REPORT (2007), http://www.ascap.com/about/annualReport/annual_2007.pdf; Money
Matters, http://www.bmi.com/about/entry/533106 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
152

See Customer License: License Fee Calculations,
weblicense/feeCalc.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
153

http://www.ascap.com/

See id.

154

See About ASCAP: Turning Performances Into Dollars, http://www.ascap.com/about/
payment/dollars.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).

155

See id.; About ASCAP: Royalty Calculation, http://www.ascap.com/about/
payment/royalties.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
156

Customer Licensees: About ASCAP Licensing, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/
about.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009)
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have received among the copyright owners based on estimates of how
much of the songwriters’ work has been used.157
[45] Therefore, because there are a number of factors that determine the
royalty payment, it is difficult to estimate how much money a songwriter
actually receives every time his musical work is performed.158
D. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHTS ON THE INTERNET
1. STREAMING TRANSMISSIONS
[46] Anytime Pandora plays a song, it involves the same ritual. First,
the user requests a file (in a non-interactive service this is sometimes
accomplished by selecting the genre of music one prefers).159 Second, as
Pandora transmits the song, it temporarily stores “buffer” copies, or
portions of the file, on the user’s computer to facilitate uninterrupted
playback.160 As soon as Pandora plays any given segment of the song, it
deletes the buffer copy responsible for that segment.161 After the
transmission is complete, no buffer copies remain on the user’s
computer.162
[47] As previously mentioned, the transmission of any song in this
manner clearly implicates the performance right of both layers of the song:

157

Id.

158

See About ASCAP: How to Get Paid At ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/
payment/paymentintro.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009); About ASCAP: Royalty
Calculation, http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/royalties.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2009).

159

See Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law,
Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 250–51 (2001).
160

Id. at 251.

161

Id.

162

Id.
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that of the musical work and of the sound recording.163 As a result, sites
like Pandora not only need to pay SoundExchange, but also obtain a
blanket license from one of the collective rights societies.164
[48] Because webcasters store temporary copies of songs on the
listeners’ computer, streaming transmissions arguably constitute
reproductions of the work as well.165 A district court in New York,
however, recently disagreed with such a broad interpretation of the
reproduction right.166 The implication of a reproduction right would
involve a new set of players, thereby increasing both transactional and
actual costs for transmission sites.167
2. DOWNLOAD TRANSMISSIONS
[49] Unlike a streaming transmission, a download transmission that
follows an iTunes purchase ends with the user retaining the file on her
hard drive.168 The user can enjoy the song at her convenience without
having to connect to the Internet.169 Since the transmitting site reproduces
the file on the user’s hard-drive, downloads clearly implicate the
reproduction right.170 Therefore, the transmitter would need to obtain the
163

See PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 224-25.

164

Id. at 225.

165

Reese, supra note 159, at 251-57.

166

United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444-47 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (holding that
the downloading of a music file constitutes a reproduction of a musical work, but not a
public performance of it). The district court also noted that “a transmission might, under
certain circumstances, constitute both a stream and a download . . .”). Id. at 446 n.5.

167

See Reese, supra note 159, at 257-59.

168

See generally Apple iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes/affiliates/download/
?itmsUrl=itms%3A%2F%2Fax.itunes.apple.com%2FWebObjects%2FMZStore.woa%2F
wa%2FstoreFront%3Fign-mscache%3D1 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
169

See id.; Reese, supra note 159, at 257-59.

170

Reese, supra note 159, at 257–59.
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compulsory mechanical license, or a license from the Harry Fox Agency
for the musical work, as well as permission from the owner of the
copyright in the sound recording.171
[50] While the public performance right is implicated if the transmitter
plays the song as the user downloads it, most digital vendors like iTunes
do not allow simultaneous streaming.172 ASCAP and BMI have argued
that even those sites are publicly performing the song within the meaning
of the statute, but this view has not prevailed.162
III. NEW FRONTIERS BRING NEW BATTLES
[51] The RIAA has been scrambling to find new sources of revenue and
to squeeze out as much as it can from the existing streams.174 To
accomplish the former, it is prepared to materialize on the vision that some
of the recording industry executives have had since the downfall of
Napster: monetizing peer-to-peer music transactions.175 As for the latter
goal, the RIAA has pushed for onerous royalty rates to be imposed

171

See id.

172

See generally Apple iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).

173

See ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 444, 446–47 (recognizing that this is an “unsettled
point of law that is subject to debate,” but classifying ASCAP’s construction as
“sweeping” and not comporting with the language and purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)
(2006): “the mere fact that a customer’s online purchase is conveyed to him in a
piecemeal manner, each segment of which is capable of playback as soon as the
transmission is completed, does not change the fact that the transaction is a data
transmission rather than a musical broadcast. Surely ASCAP would not contend that if a
retail purchaser of musical records begins audibly playing each tape or disc as soon as he
receives it the vendor is engaging in a public performance.”).

174

See, e.g., Posting of Brandon Lovested to UsefulArts.us, http://usefularts.us/
2008/05/19/los-angeles-countys-new-revenue-source-copyright-infringement (May 19,
2008); Greg Sandoval, Sources: AT&T, Comcast May Help RIAA Foil Piracy, Jan. 28,
2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10151389-93.html.
175

See Erika Morphy, RIAA Beats Minnesota Mom to the Tune of $1.92 Million, June 19,
2009, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/67384.html?wlc=1252972915.
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primarily on Internet radio.176 In evaluating this dual-headed strategy, it is
useful—indeed imperative—to remember that the goal of copyright law is
to enrich the public domain by incentivizing the creator.177 By this
standard, both of the RIAA’s initiatives should be discouraged.
A. RIAA VS. ITUNES
[52] After facing consecutive years of declining revenue, the recording
industry is poised to roll out its new strategy of monetizing the digital
transmissions of music: a blanket license to perform and reproduce sound
recordings to be collected and sold by an organization called “Choruss.”178
While the initial experiment will involve selected universities, the hope is
that the majority of Internet users will subscribe in one form or another.
As one can imagine, Choruss has already faced criticism; unthinkable
epithets like “music tax” and “covenant not to sue” have been flying
around on blogs to describe the concept.179 But the real problems are how
Choruss will actually function and its effects on the emerging digital
markets.
1. A NEW BUSINESS MODEL FOR THE RIAA
[53] Born out of necessity, Choruss represents the recording industry’s
attempt to adapt its business model to the realities of the 21st century. In
charging individuals a one-time fee for the right to share files, Choruss is a
way for the RIAA to have its cake and eat it too. If successful, Choruss

176

See Posting of Steven Marks to RIAA Music Notes Blog,
http://www.riaa.com/blog.php?content_selector=Its-Licensing-Stupid (July 8, 2009).

177

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).

178

See Fred von Lohmann, Move on Choruss, Pro and Con, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Mar. 20, 2009, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/more-choruss-pro-andcon.
179

See Posting of Michael Masnick to Techdirt, http://www.techdirt.com/ (Mar. 18, 2009,
10:17 EST).
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would inoculate peer-to-peer exchanges by mandating regular data
inspection and then charge a university or ISP a flat royalty fee.180
[54] The RIAA struggles are well documented. Even the chairperson of
Columbia Records, Rick Rubin, admits that the recording industry is a
“dinosaur.”181 As he explains, “[u]ntil a new model is agreed upon and
rolling, [Columbia Records] can be the best at the existing paradigm, but
until the paradigm shifts, it’s going to be a declining business.”182 But
opinions vary because different things are at stake in these precarious
times for the labels. For some, it is a promise of liberation—liberation of
the artist from unfair contracts and the consumer from unfair prices. This
view is not shared by the RIAA. Indeed, in the eyes of one music
executive, David Geffen (founder of Geffen records), preserving a role for
the record labels means nothing less than saving the music business:
IPods made it easy for people to share music, and
Apple took a big percentage of the business that once
belonged to the record companies. The subscription model
is the only way to save the music business. If music is
easily available at a price of five or six dollars a month,
then nobody will steal it.183
In Geffen’s view, the RIAA is the last standing guard against music
thieves.184 Should it fall, he reasons, music business will no longer be
viable.185
180

See Eliot Van Buskirk, Three Major Record Labels Join the “Choruss”, EPICENTER,
Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/12/warner-music-gr.

181

Lynn Hirschberg, The Music Man, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 26,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/magazine/02rubin.t.html?pagewanted5&_r1.
182

Id.

183

Id. (emphasis added).
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See id.
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Id.
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[55] Pinning down the source of RIAA’s problems is not as easy as it
may appear. At least one challenge that has faced the industry since the
day Napster was released is similar to the one that the print media must
confront today: battling social norms.186 Indeed, a segment of the
population today apparently believes that paying for music is voluntary.187
Rather than offer free content online the way many newspapers have, the
recording industry has until now pursued a “fear strategy,” going after
individual file sharers.188 But thousands of lawsuits later,189 the RIAA
may have realized that suing its customers was a strategy doomed to fail
from the start.190

186

Walter Isaacson, How to Save Your Newspaper, TIME (Feb. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877191,00.html
(arguing
that
traditional journalism is more popular than ever, but fewer people are paying for it
because people do not expect to pay for content available online).

187

See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach
Us About Persuading People To Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 655
(2006).
188

Id.

189

See Posting of RIAA Watcher to RIAA Watch, http:// sharenomore.blogspot.com
(June 16, 2006 14:57 EST) (noting that the RIAA had sued almost 18,000 people as of
2006).
190

See Sam Gustin, Fee For All, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/newsmarkets/top-5/2008/03/27/Warners-New-Web-Guru/index.html (describing how Jim
Griffin, the record industry guru responsible for spearheading a plan that would sustain a
profitable business model, admits that the RIAA should not be suing students or “people
in their homes”); Schultz, supra note 187, at 662–65 (showing that suits may have the
important effect of putting people on notice that infringement is illegal, but it quickly
reaches the point of diminishing returns as exhibited by the passing of the NET ACT,
which criminalized some infringement conduct but failed to deter it); see also Fred von
Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1095434496352 (arguing that while RIAA had
netted a high “batting-average” in prevailing in these suits, they are having little impact).
But see Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of
Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 729-35 (2005)
(arguing that while these lawsuits have had a limited downside because consumers
identify with the artist rather than the RIAA that is suing them, their upside is palpable:
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[56] To be sure, the consumer’s state of mind is not the end of RIAA’s
troubles; the cost of recording, producing, and distributing records has also
declined, as has the need for brick and mortar record stores.191 If that was
not bad enough already for the RIAA, the advent of digital transactions
has made it even worse; the growth of peer-to-peer file sharing has led to
an increase in copyright infringement, while artists have gained a way to
connect with their fans more cheaply, without a label.192 In fact, given the
reduced access costs, record companies may no longer be needed to fill
their traditional “role of absorbing both the risks [that a new record or
artist will fizzle] and the costs in the recording business.”193 Some big
names like Madonna have already split with their labels.194
[57] One seemingly logical path the recording industry could have
taken is throwing full support behind legal alternatives to music file

consumers have become more aware that songs are protected by copyright, and evidence
that file sharing has grown is misleading).
191

See Schultz, supra note 187, at 689.

192

See id.

193

Mark F. Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and the Future of the Music Business,
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 685, 690 (2009).

194

See Duncan Riley, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Madonna Dumps Record
Industry, TechCrunch, http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/10/10/and-the-walls-cametumbling-down-madonna-dumps-record-industry (stating that Nine Inch Nails, Oasis,
Madonna, and Jamiroquai have moved away from record industry, some even offering
future albums directly to the public: “the deal shows that even for a world famous act, a
record company is no longer required in the days of digital downloads . . .”); see also
Mark F. Schultz, supra note 193, at 692 (stating that 2007 was a milestone year where the
Spice Girls, Paul McCartney and Joni Mitchell signed recording deals not involving
record labels). See generally David Carr, Media Business Tips from U2, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2005), at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/business/
28carr.html (“[w]hile [others] were scolding and threatening fans for downloading music
. . . U2 was bust working on a new business model . . . a special edition iPod . . . was a
smash hit and gave visibility to the band at a time when most radio station playlists don’t
extend much beyond a narrow selection . . .”).
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sharing like iTunes.195 Mark Schultz makes this argument by drawing on
research in the field of psychology that demonstrates that music fans want
to obey the law, but also need to feel that others are doing the same.196 In
practice, this notion of reciprocity is aided by tighter bonds that labels
would be wise to develop.197
[58] However, this does not seem to be where the industry is
heading.198 Perhaps kicking itself for not signing an agreement with
Napster back in 2000, the RIAA is poised to embrace a subscription-like
fee model. As Rick Rubin envisions it:
You’d pay, say, $19.95 a month, and the music will
come anywhere you’d like. In this new world, there will be
a virtual library that will be accessible from your car, from
your cellphone, from your computer, from your television.
Anywhere. The iPod will be obsolete, but there would be a
Walkman-like device you could plug into speakers at
home. You’ll say, ‘Today I want to listen to . . . Simon and
Garfunkel,’ and there they are. The service can have
demos, bootlegs, concerts, whatever context the artist wants

195

See Jeff Goodell, Steve Jobs: The Rolling Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 25,
2003, at 31, 32-33, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5939600/stevejobs_the_rolling_stone_ interview. Steve Jobs, founder of Apple, explained: “Our
position from the beginning was that eighty percent of the people stealing music online
don’t really want to be thieves. . . . It is corrosive to one’s character to steal. We want to
provide a legal alternative.” Id.
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Schultz, supra note 187, at 665-68.
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Id. at 668-69, 719-21 (stating that jambands, such as fans of the Grateful Dead who
followed the band from show to show, even taking interest in the band members’
personal lives, provide an interesting case study of how to engender in this bond).
198

See Hirschberg, supra note 181 (noting that the co-head of Columbia Records, Rick
Rubin, suggested that the direct digital sale model embraced by iTunes will soon be
obsolete).
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to put out. And once that model is put into place, the
industry will grow 10 times the size it is now.199
As Rubin’s quote illustrates, the industry has come to grips with the fact
that it cannot control file sharing. However, that does not mean it cannot
profit from the exchange.
[59] The novel role that Rubin advocates for the RIAA is that of a oneway stream flowing into a river full of file-sharers. The stream would
carry only the music files that the industry deems appropriate for sharing.
The users can still have fun tossing those files back-and-forth. Of course,
before they can get their feet wet, people would have to pay the RIAA an
admissions fee. The fee would be worth it, Rubin promises, because
without having to purchase each individual song, users could have their
own constant stream of music. And having paid for their ticket, people
would no longer be deemed infringers . . . at least by the RIAA. This is
the picture painted by the RIAA’s next great hope – Choruss.200
[60] In 2008, Warner Music Group hired Jim Griffin—a noted industry
critic and proponent of a licensing fee model.201 Griffin’s contract gives
him three years to find a way to pool money from users’ fees that could
then be distributed to copyright holders.202 His plan to “monetize the
anarchy of the [I]nternet”203 has materialized into Choruss—an

199

Id.

200

See generally Brennon Slattery, The Day the Music Service Ruckus Died, PC WORLD,
Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.pcworld.com/article/159258/the_day_the_music_service_
ruckus_died.html; William Colsher, Ruckus Gains Users, THE DAILY COLLEGIAN
ONLINE, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2007/09/20/ruckus_gains_
users_2.aspx (giving background on Ruckus, a recently shutdown free music download
service that loaded songs with digital rights management (DRM) and was supported by
advertisements, which should be distinguished from Choruss).
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Gustin, supra note 190.
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independent entity currently backed by three major labels that will grant
blanket licenses to universities and ISPs, allowing users to stream and to
download music.204 The experiment will start in the fall of 2009 on
selected campuses, with the hope of moving on to ISPs a year later.205
2. THE CASE FOR CHORUSS
[61] Ever since the RIAA started mulling over a Choruss-like model,
criticisms of the concept have been emerging.206 From a pragmatic
standpoint, some have indicated that there would be problems in
implementing Choruss.207 While there are reasons to believe that Choruss
would be incompatible with the existing digital markets and with various
statutes, Jim Griffin, the mastermind behind Choruss, recently held a
public presentation with the intent of dispelling certain myths.208
Although he was light on specifics, Griffin’s presentation provides a
useful insight into the RIAA’s vision for its future.209
[62] Choruss embodies a license fee model that functions differently
than the subscription fee model discussed by the label executives with the
Napster CEO Hank Barry in 2000.210 Some have already called the
204

Posting of Fred von Lohmann to Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ (Mar.
20, 2009).
205

Jim Griffin, PowerPoint Presentation: Choruss: A New Business Model for Digital
Music (Mar. 3, 2009), available at https://admin.na3.acrobat.com/_a729300474/
p72627963/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009). Griffin explains that universities are essentially
controlled laboratories where the students may be subject to all kinds of fees imposed on
them. Id.
206

See generally Masnick, supra note 179; Cheaper Than Therapy, http://benjamin
lipman.wordpress.com/ (Dec. 10, 2008, 14:14 EST).
207

See Masnick, supra note 179; Cheaper Than Therapy, supra note 206.
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Griffin, supra note 205.
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See id.
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Id. (“[Napster] offered audio fingerprinting for determining actual usage and was one
subscription service – albeit a potentially huge one – but it was not an ISP.”)

38

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

Choruss model a tax because non-users of music would theoretically still
have to pay a fee.211 Others see it as an extortion scheme – the RIAA
forcing people to pay in return for not suing.212
[63] More nuanced criticism comes from two copyright attorneys,
Christian Castle and Amy Mitchell.213 As they explain, any proposal to
legalize file sharing amounts to “a capitulation to the disintegration of
private property rights online.”214 In other words, despite the illegal file
sharing that persists today, Griffin’s portrayal of anarchy is farfetched.215
In reality, music property rights are successfully exchanged via digital
markets like iTunes, Rhapsody, and Amazon.com.216 Legalizing peer-topeer file sharing would instantly undercut these markets.217 And any
licensing system would have to incur tremendous transactional costs,
which would, in turn, detract from the payments artists deserve.218

211

See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 190. David Barrett, an engineering manager for peer-topeer networks, explained: “It’s too late to charge people for what they’re already getting
for free . . . . This is just taxation of a basic, universal service that already exists, for the
benefit [of] a distant power that actively harasses the people being taxed without offering
them any meaningful representation.” Id.
212

See, e.g., Reihan Salam, The Music Industry’s Extortion Scheme, SLATE, Apr. 25,
2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2189888 (“Swap files to your heart’s content – we
promise, we won’t sue you . . . .”).
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Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, What’s Wrong with ISP Music Licensing?,
ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 2008, 4, at 4-7.
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Id. at 4.
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Griffin, supra note 205.
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See, e.g., Seeking Alpha, Amazon, Rhapsody Gain in Digital Music Market; iTunes
Still Top Dog, http://seekingalpha.com/article/99383-amazon-rhapsody-gain-in-digitalmusic-market-itunes-still-top-dog (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
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See Castle & Mitchell, supra note 213, at 4-5.
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Id. at 7. Castle and Mitchell argue that some of the functions the system would need
to accomplish are: “File recognition; UPC/ISRC/ISWC matching; W-9s for all royalty
participants . . . ; Tax reporting; Royalty accounting; Letters of direction for producers,
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[64] To fairly divide the pool of money, any license fee model
presupposes the ability of the ISP to track what songs have been
downloaded or streamed through its network.219 But in the absence of a
compulsory license, no Choruss-like arrangement would be able to secure
the license of every copyright holder.220 As a result, tracking usage would
invariably show some infringement, potentially leading ISPs to lose their
safe harbor protection under the DMCA.221 ISPs are shielded from
secondary liability under § 512(c)(1)(A), only if the ISP:
(i)
does not have actual knowledge that the
material or an activity using the material on the system or
network is infringing;
(ii)
in the absence of such actual knowledge, is
not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material.222

remixers, or other royalty participants; Monthly accounting; Royalty audits; SarbanesOxley compliance.”
219

See id. at 6-7.

220

Id. at 7; see Griffin, supra note 205. Castle and Mitchell point out that ISP licensing
proposals have not received support from the copyright community. Castle & Mitchell,
supra note 213, at 4.
221

Castle & Mitchell, supra note 213, at 7; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2006).

222

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Note that the safe harbor only protects against
monetary liability. Id. But copyright holders may be granted injunctive relief, which
would require ISPs to find and block access to infringing material, or remove it before it
is downloaded. See id.
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While losing its safe harbor protection would not automatically make an
ISP liable, it would certainly bring it to the doorstep of contributory
infringement.223
[65] In response to the criticism stirring over the concept of a licensecollecting model, and without giving much detail about Choruss itself,
Griffin gave a presentation in early March 2009.224 At the beginning of
the talk Griffin stressed that new technology is not the answer to the

223

Courts find contributory liability when “one who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971). The knowledge requirement for purposes of § 512(c), however, may be different
from that of the contributory infringement inquiry. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We do not agree that Napster’s potential
liability for contributory and vicarious infringement renders the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act inapplicable per se.”). Some courts still treat the two concepts separately,
thereby assuming that a contributory infringer could use one of the safe harbors under the
DCMA. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 732 (9th Cir.
2007). What might help ISPs is a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit in which the court
did not impose “investigative duties” on the provider. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C.,
481 F.3d 751, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an online provider did not need to
determine whether passwords were used for infringement purposes). Therefore, it is
possible that ISPs would not be required to fish for rare infringing use even if they know
such use exists. See id. at 763-64. The investigative duties involved in Amazon.com
were much more burdensome because the direct infringement was considerably removed
from the provider’s contribution. See Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 727-29. Here, the
conduct would occur on the ISP’s own network. In any event, considering some of the
recent case law development in this area, a full discussion of an ISP’s potential liability is
beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933-34 (2005) (introducing the inducement theory of
liability which holds that facilitators of direct infringement may be liable despite showing
capability of substantial noninfringing use). The important point for the purpose of this
discussion is that a Choruss scheme would put ISPs in serious danger of liability, making
this type of arrangement less realistic. Castle & Mitchell, supra note 213, at 7.
224
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anarchy of the Internet.225 The remainder of the presentation focused on
dispelling myths.226
[66] First, Choruss would not be an attempt to legalize peer-to-peer file
sharing, Griffin explained, because the focus is on the network;
webcasting would be subject to the license, as well.227 He also took issue
with the tax label.228 The government would not be moving in to impose
any fees, and agreeing to the scheme would be up to individual ISPs.229
Griffin observed, however, that university students share the burden for
supporting gyms and libraries, and sustaining access to music does not
have to be any different.230 Also denying that Choruss essentially amounts
to extortion or a “covenant not to sue” (the phrase Choruss proponents had
actually used to describe the system), Griffin emphasized that Choruss’s
mission is to license rather than to sue.231
[67] Second, taking note of the more specific criticism, Griffin rejected
the notion that Choruss would put iTunes out of business, as there is a
market for both services.232 Griffin explained that some individuals
engage in illegal file sharing, while others choose to purchase tracks from
iTunes.233 According to Griffin, Choruss would monetize the practice of
the former without affecting the latter.234
225

Id.
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[68] Finally, after confessing that he was not a lawyer, Griffin offered a
distinction between monthly network inspections that ISPs would perform
and the actual knowledge of specific infringement as it is occurring, which
is required for contributory infringement (and for loss of safe harbor
protection).235 Pointing to the successes of ASCAP and BMI that are also
responsible for aggregating copyright owners, Griffin maintained that the
Choruss “experiment” holds promise.236 But he admitted that both the
system and the law may need some tinkering to make it work.237 Indeed,
Griffin commented that it “would not be a surprise” if the law changed in
this area.238
3. CHORUSS’S CASE EVALUATED
[69] The problem with Choruss is not the idea of giving out a blanket
license. Rather, it is how Griffin plans to carry it out. Putting the burden
on ISPs and universities to monitor their networks not only raises both
practical and legal concerns, but, by implementing an opaque accounting
system and by undercutting the emerging digital markets, Choruss also
threatens to detract from the goals of copyright law.
[70] The call for blanket licensing in the digital world is not a concept
advocated by the struggling RIAA alone. Lawrence Lessig advocates
“simple blanket licensing” to address online music piracy.239 William
Fisher boldly proposes the replacement of copyright of music by a general
fee, coupled with digital watermarks on all media capable of digital use.240
235

Id.

236

Id.

237

Id.

238

Id.

239

LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 271 (2008) (arguing that such licensing would result in small fees that would
“decriminalize file-sharing”).
240

William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities, http://www.law.harvard.
edu/faculty/tfisher/Music.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009); see also WILLIAM W. FISHER
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Jessica Litman argues that the law should encourage music file sharing,
while instituting a statutory yet voluntary general license, in order to more
easily distinguish between music that is “hoarded” and “shared.”241 And
there are others still.242 To be sure, all of these plans are different, but the
concept of charging for the privilege of peer-to-peer file sharing is the
same. Therefore, while the RIAA’s proposal for a blanket licensing
scheme may be self-serving, it is not necessarily without merit.
[71] Indeed, battles over labels—like whether blanket licensing is a tax
or amounts to extortion—contribute little to the substantive debate. Yes, a
fee would be imposed on users, so it may act like a tax even in the absence
of government involvement.243 And yes, file-sharers would no longer face
the prospect of lawsuits, so the plan may seem like a covenant not to
sue.244 But it is not clear why semantics should play a role in determining
the best way to incentivize performers and songwriters in order to
maximize the public’s access to music.
[72] The difficulties lie in the actual implementation of Choruss.245
Griffin claims that details about Choruss have been thin because it is only
an experiment, and he expects the system to change with input from

III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199258 (2004) (proposing a tax on peer-to-peer file-sharing activities while advocating free
access to music that is used only in noncommercial contexts).
241

Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 1, 41-42
(2004) (advocating the avoidance of intermediaries so that the right to collect would be
held by the creators).
242

Id. at 33-34 (describing briefly proposals by Netanel, Lunney, Ku, and Gervais).

243

Griffin, supra note 205.

244

Id.

245

See Posting of Adam Thierer to The Technology Liberation Front,
http://techliberation.com/ (Dec. 1, 2008) (criticizing Lessig’s proposal for a blanket
licensing system for the lack of details and appreciation of regulatory complexities).
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universities.246 But there are reasons to be skeptical of Choruss. To begin
with, the only way for Choruss to truly succeed is if there is a fair way to
track song usage on various networks.247 To the extent that Griffin hopes
to rely on current technology, he may be disappointed.248 Moreover, if
accurate monitoring technology does indeed develop, then more
fundamental problems will surface.
[73] First, there would be privacy concerns.249 Putting aside the
political headwind that Big Brother monitoring would face, there would be
legal implications to overcome.250 Indeed, any honest inspection of users’
network data would immediately be on tenuous legal ground.251 Not only

246

Griffin, supra note 205 (admitting that Choruss does not even have a website at this
time).
247

See Castle & Mitchel, supra note 213, at 6-7.

248

E-mail from Christian Castle to author (Feb. 18, 2009, 09:36 EST) (on file with
author) (explaining that cache monitoring on the network level, aside from presenting
privacy concerns, would be “virtually unauditable from a royalty accounting
perspective,” and getting ASCAP or BMI distribution formulas would also be
problematic as BMI and ASCAP are prohibited by their antitrust consent decrees from
entering into side business that uses their data and that information is secret anyway).

249

See Posting of Saul Hansell to Bits Blog, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ (Mar. 13,
2009, 18:17 EST) (discussing the increased possibility of new legislation actually
reflecting privacy concerns, as a result of the new FTC chief being a long-time privacy
advocate).
250

See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 21-22, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261344) (tracing the history of ISP monitoring and
discussing legal implications).
251

See id. (manuscript at 22); see also Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its
Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual
Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633,
671 (2008) (explaining that even assuming the ISP has a right to control copyright
infringing behavior, it is not clear that this can justify packet inspection).
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do numerous state and federal laws reach private ISPs,252 but if Choruss
was implemented in public universities as planned, then the schools would
have to answer Fourth Amendment claims.253
[74] Second, as Castle points out, contributory infringement concerns
would place online service providers, which are defined broadly by
copyright law to include universities, in a Catch 22;254 either employ

252

See Ohm, supra note 250 (manuscript at 65-68) (discussing federal statutes,
concluding that there are persuasive arguments for and against liability that ISPs would
be wise not to test).
253

See, e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that an individual does not lose reasonable expectation of privacy just because he is
plugged into a network); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979), in
which the Supreme Court held:
In such circumstances, where an individual’s subjective
expectations had been “conditioned” by influences alien to wellrecognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations
obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope
of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a
“legitimate expectation of privacy” existed in such cases, a normative
inquiry would be proper. Id.
While courts have considered policies to determine reasonable expectations of
privacy, there may be a limit to how broad those policies may be. Monitoring employees
for illegal network activity is one thing, regularly searching every student’s network
activity is quite another. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has observed, the police may not
announce that every house would be regularly searched and expect that homeowners’
Fourth Amendment claim falters on the subjective prong. But see United States v.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a government employee
could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files he downloaded from the
Internet in light of the policy that notified him that his Internet use would be overseen).
If universities hope to argue that students have no subjective expectations of privacy
because the policy of inspecting their network activity would be widely known, they may
be disappointed to find that argument is not bulletproof.

254

17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(B) (2006) (defining service provider as “provider of online
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes any entity
described in subparagraph (A)”).
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accurate tracking and risk liability or cling to the safe harbor and
guarantee arbitrary distribution of royalty payments.255
[75] Third, there is the underlying policy of copyright law to consider.
In his presentation, Griffin repeatedly referred to collective rights
societies, ASCAP and BMI, as successful models for blanket license
schemes employed by copyright holders.256 After all, as explained above,
the two organizations collected and distributed more than one billion
dollars in royalty payments last year alone.257 Copyright law, however,
demands that the merit of any royalty collection scheme be measured by
the rewards given to the creator. Using this yardstick, there are reasons to
be concerned with the RIAA taking its cue from ASCAP and BMI;258
stories of royalty payments never reaching artists are bountiful, as are

255

See supra note 223.

256

Griffin, supra note 205.

257

See Newhouse, supra note 151.

258

See, e.g., Richard Hayes Phillips, How One Independent Musician Defeated BMI,
WOODPECKER RECORDS, http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/phillips.html.
Phillips writes:
ASCAP and BMI will tell you it is foolish not to join their
organizations, because you cannot collect royalties unless you do. But
the truth is that unless you are famous, you are unlikely to collect any
royalties even if you do join. The distribution of royalties is based
upon airplay. ASCAP secretly tapes about 0.1% of all radio broadcasts
each year, and only 1% of the sampled hours come from public radio
stations. BMI uses radio station logbooks to determine who gets
royalties. Owners of performance venues are required to pay licensing
fees even though none of the money will ever go to those who wrote
the music being played on their stage, unless it is also being played on
the radio. Id.;
see also Harvey Reid, ASCAP & BMI – Protectors of Artists or Shadowy Thieves?,
WOODPECKER
RECORDS,
http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/royaltypolitics.html (cataloging many of the problems with ASCAP and BMI distribution
methods).
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criticisms of their “blackbox method” of divvying up the proceeds.259 And
without an honest accounting method, Choruss can easily start sounding
like a cacophony.260
[76] Nevertheless, comparing Choruss to the collective rights societies
is not entirely fair. Even if ASCAP and BMI were respectable models for
aggregating licenses and distributing payments, there is at least one
notable difference from any scheme Griffin has in mind; these collective
rights societies (and SoundExchange for that matter) distribute payments
directly to the artists.261 And while Choruss will be an independent
organization, licenses will flow from the labels.262 This has two
implications: first, labels will recoup any fees the artists owe them (e.g.,
for recording and promoting the records);263 and second, the performer’s
rate will be much smaller (less than ten percent) than what artists would
receive under SoundExchange (forty-five percent) or ASCAP/BMI

259

See, e.g., Reid, supra note 258 (supporting the claim that promoters of performance
venues who want to make sure their artists are being fairly compensated feel so strongly
that their money is not being fairly distributed, they have offered to submit logs of
performances, thus far without success; money could easily be paid to artists who had
nothing to do with a performance without any suspicion because the identities of
“experts” who identify unknown works are not made public).
260

See, e.g., Future of Music Coalition, Principles for Artist Compensation in New
Business Models, http://futureofmusic.org/article/article/principles-artist-compensationnew-business-models-0 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (stating that traditional sample
methods of accounting for royalties have favored the biggest artists).

261

See, e.g., PASSMAN, supra note 63, at 225 (noting ASCAP and BMI pay songwriters
directly); SoundExchange: Future of Music Coalition, supra note 82 (stating
SoundExchange makes payments directly to artists).
262

Castle, supra note 238.

263

See, e.g., Future of Music Coalition, supra note 260 (“Without direct payment, all the
revenue generated by these new models will be delivered to the labels for dissemination
to the artists in the form of royalties, but history has demonstrated that labels accounting
practices are not to be trusted.”).
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schemes (as much as ninety percent).264 In the end, this would reaffirm
Choruss’s true mission of ensuring that the RIAA has a profitable business
model in the digital market. That mission, however, conflicts with the
goal of copyright law, which instead focuses on rewarding the artists.
[77] Perhaps the most dubious response that Griffin offered to a specific
concern was his vision of a world where the market for iTunes functions
in harmony with a system like Choruss.265 It defies common sense to
expect people to pay iTunes $1.29 per song266 after they have subscribed
to another music service – one simply does not buy pizza on the way to an
all-you-can-eat buffet. Griffin claims that iTunes attracts individuals who
have plenty of money but little time as they can quickly sample music
before making their decisions.267 File sharing is more time consuming, he
says, but it allows music aficionados to download a great number of
songs.268 Of course, the more plausible distinction, and the one initially
made by RIAA executives when it was convenient, is between legal and
illegal activity.269 Indeed, as Schultz demonstrates, people generally want

264

SoundExchange: Future of Music Coalition, supra note 82 (SoundExchange pays the
performer forty-five percent of royalties); see also Griffin, supra note 205. Of course,
SoundExchange would only distribute money in the case of streaming music, which is
not an unfair comparison given that Choruss seeks to monetize that use as well. In the
case of ASCAP and BMI, the ninety percent rate is a ceiling (after subtracting the
transactional fees the societies charge). Perhaps big names receive even more than that
for performances they did not earn at the expense of other artists.

265

Griffin, supra note 205.

266

Posting by malware to techPowerUp!, http://www.techpowerup.com/ (Oct. 16, 2007,
21:09 EST) (“DRM-free song files were originally priced at $1.29 per song . . . .”).
267

Griffin, supra note 205.

268

Id.

269

See PC World, Apple Touts ITunes Success, http://www.pcworld.com/
article/111304/apple_touts_itunes_success.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009). Steve Jobs,
CEO of Apple, said: “The ITunes Music Store is changing the way people buy music.
Selling five million songs in the first eight weeks has far surpassed our expectations, and
clearly illustrates that many customers are hungry for a legal way to acquire their music
online.” Id. Doug Morris, CEO of Universal, said: “The ITunes Music Store has defined
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to obey the law, opting for the legal path when they think others are doing
the same.270 But examining the psychology of a peer-to-peer file-sharer is
beyond the scope of this article. Thus, it is likely that Choruss would draw
a healthy number of its subscribers from digital music markets like iTunes,
Rhapsody, and Amazon.com.271
[78] Discouraging the growth of these markets is poor policy. Their
interactivity encourages exposure to new artists,272 while direct sales
ensure that the deserving performer, songwriter, publisher, and producer
are paid. At the expense of these two benefits, Choruss would provide a
more reliable way for record labels to collect money from all listeners.
We should be hesitant to make these sacrifices. Griffin may see anarchy
online, 273 but others take note of the steady growth that the digital markets

what it means for people to have music instantly – and legally – at their fingertips. The
ITunes Music Store is pushing us into the future of how music is produced and
consumed.” Id. Roger Ames, CEO of Warner, said: “Everyone in our industry is looking
for a solution, and Apple is leading the way with the ITunes Music Store.” Id.
270

Schultz, supra note 187, at 665-66. To be fair, there are other reasons that make
iTunes attractive: high quality recordings, user-friendly browsing, peer reviews, and most
importantly, seamless integration with users’ iPods. However, if people have an
unlimited access to songs, it is unlikely that iTunes’s perks will be sufficient to keep
people coming back for music.

271

See Karl Joyce, Amazon and Rhapsody Show Strong Gains in Digital Music Market
While iTunes Remains Dominant, IPSOS NEWS CENTER, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.ipsosna.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=4089.
272

See, e.g., Sam Costello, Using iTunes Genius To Discover New Music, ABOUT.COM,
http://ipod.about.com/od/advanceditunesuse/ss/genius_store.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2009) (detailing how iTunes Genius analyzes the library to suggest new music); Jasmine
France, Goombah Helps iTunes Users Discover New Music, CNET NEWS,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-9680599-1.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009)
(describing add-on software for iTunes that identifies songs in the users’ library to make
recommendations of other artists); Amazon.com, Follow Your Muse and Discover New
Artists
and
Sounds,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/richpub/syltguides/fullview/
3B873R6GV5BEU (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (applauding Amazon’s recommendations
of new artists based on other customers’ recommendations).
273

Griffin, supra note 205.
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have exhibited since their emergence. And while continuing to increase
their sales will not be easy when a black market infested with pirates
continues to detract from legitimate sales,274 iTunes, for one, has been
defying skeptics for years.275 If we are serious about incentivizing
creators of music, then we may have to tolerate growing pains for the
recording industry in the digital era.
B. RIAA V. INTERNET RADIO
[79] As discussed earlier, Internet radio is an exciting new medium for
transmitting music to anyone armed with a computer or one of a growing
number of Internet-ready gadgets. But it is also a medium on the verge of
collapsing.276 Although this article has focused on Pandora, it is only one
of the many Internet radio sites available today.277 That being said,
Pandora is a different kind of site.
Its highly interactive and
individualized experience differs from that offered by other webcasters
that generally only aggregate music based on other listeners’

274

RIAA, Piracy: Online and on the Street, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last
visited Sept. 15, 2009) (citing one study estimating that music piracy causes $12.5 billion
of economic losses every year); see also Stan J. Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads
Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence so Far 27 (June 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=414162) (concluding that illegal peerto-peer file-sharing is the only explainable cause of the decline in album sales); cf.
Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation Against
Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005) (documenting an increase in traffic
within peer-to-peer networks from 2002 to 2004).
275

See, e.g., Posting by Glenn to Coolfer, http://www.coolfer.com/blog/ (July 24, 2006,
17:50 EST) (showing how at the time, rivals hardly thought iTunes would be the
revolutionary service that it has become).
276

See Peter Whoriskey, Giant of Internet Radio Nears Its ‘Last Stand,’ WASH. POST,
Aug. 16, 2008, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/08/15/AR2008081503367.html.
277

See, e.g., Paul Gil, The Top 5 Internet Radio Stations of 2009, ABOUT.COM,
http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/readerpicks/ss/bestnetradio.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2009) (listing Nullsoft SHOUTcast Radio, realRadio, and Accuradio as the top three).
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recommendations.278 But as one of the more familiar Internet radio sites,
with a founder and CEO who have actively campaigned on behalf of all
webcasters, Pandora serves as a useful reminder of the type of casualties
the next couple of years may bring.279
[80] Webcasters allow the public greater access to music and expose
artists to an audience in a way traditional radio simply does not. These are
advantages that matter for anyone who is worried about the policy goals of
copyright protection. The high royalty rates imposed on the webcasters,
however, have made the new business difficult to sustain.280 Indeed,

278

See CrunchBase, supra note 28. The word “interactive” as it is normally understood,
and as it accurately describes Pandora’s interface (for Pandora’s constant response to the
user’s feedback), does not mean to imply that Pandora is an “interactive” transmitter
within the meaning of § 114. Indeed, Digital Music Association, an organization to
which Pandora belongs, has negotiated with SoundExchange to determine the rates for
the compulsory license, making it evident that Pandora has been assumed to be noninteractive. Pandora takes steps to protect this status by restricting skipping, disallowing
rewinding, and limiting the number of times a song can be played each hour. At least one
commentator has argued that Pandora is gambling with its non-interactive status by
customizing listeners’ music. See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog,
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/ (Nov. 17, 2008 ); Pandora Internet Radio Frequently
Asked Questions, http://blog.pandora.com/faq/#25 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (“Our
music licenses do not allow us to play a specific song immediately, or ‘on demand.’”).
But see M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SYDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE
DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 72 (Robert Nirkind & Sylvia Warren eds.,
10th ed. 2007), which explains:
The definition of “interactive” (or “noninteractive”) is
constantly being pushed to take advantage of lower rates and
compulsory license. Pandora, for example, has created personalized
streaming channels for an individual based on their tastes. Pandora is
gambling that “noninteractive” covers services where listeners do not
have high-resolution control over what they are listening to. The fact
that their channels are custom-created for an individual puts them
outside of any rational understanding of noninteractive. Id.
279

See Newhouse, supra note 48 (providing the testimony of Tim Westergren, founder of
Pandora, given before Congress on behalf of Pandora and the Digital Media Association).
280

See Whoriskey, supra note 276.
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Pandora provides a revealing case study for the current debate over royalty
rates. Pandora keeps the user engaged while promoting artists, yet it
teeters on the verge of collapse under the RIAA’s consistent push for
unreasonably high payments.281 From a policy standpoint, there is no
compelling reason why Congress should be quick to compensate a
struggling recording industry at the expense of the two constituents with
which copyright law is concerned, the artist and the public.
1. WHAT IS AT STAKE?
[81] Internet radio offers several advantages over traditional
broadcasters—advantages that matter if we are trying to pursue the general
goals of copyright law. First, Internet radio provides airtime for new and
little-known performers.282 While terrestrial radio has faced much
controversy over its payola system that, as a practical matter, limits
airtime to popular songs and established artists,283 Internet radio is userdriven, playing whatever the taste of a particular listener demands.

281

See id.

282

See Newhouse, supra note 48, where Westergren appears before Congress and quotes
a Pandora listener:
I think the best thing you’ve done is introduced me to so many
artists that I love but would have never known that they existed
otherwise. Now I buy their albums and look for upcoming shows in
my area. You’ve done the music industry a great service from what I
can tell. Id.
Westergren also quotes a musician:
Hi guys – just wanted to thank you for putting my music into
your system. I have had sales all over the US from people who found
me via your site. Pandora is great. I use it all the time. And I can’t
believe what a promotional tool it has become for my own music. Id.
283

See Eric Boehlert, Will Congress Tackle Pay-for-Play?, SALON.COM, June 25, 2002,
http://dir.salon.com/story/ent/feature/2002/06/25/pfp_congress/index.html (stating the
pay-for-play cost to the music industry is $150 million a year, effectively shutting off
commercial FM radio for many artists).
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Making listeners more accessible to artists who are not bankrolled by
major labels, but still presenting the public with “useful Arts,” furthers the
goals of copyright law. That is to say, more artists are incentivized to
create music and the public domain is enriched by their contributions.
[82] Second, Internet radio broadens the public’s access to music.
Without any limitation on radio frequency, broadcasting online offers an
unlimited variety of music.284 Traditional radio stations often have to
collapse different genres of music in order to have sufficiently varied
playlists.285 As a result, some people who, for example, love old-school
rap but cannot stand today’s hip-hop may never tune in.286 This is a nonissue with Internet radio, as people have access to thousands of
channels.287
[83] Third, unlike terrestrial radio stations, webcasters’ channels can
afford to retain their unique flavors. Having to cater to determined
geographic regions, radio stations have always had to have a specific mix
of songs in their playlists to sustain a reliable audience.288 Indeed, one can

284

STAN GIBILISCO, HANDBOOK OF RADIO AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 547-48 (1999);
see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (“The facilities of
radio are limited and therefore precious . . . .”).
285

E.g., Hot 97, http://www.hot97.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).

286

See, e.g., Posting of Mental_Floss to Blogcritics Music, http://blogcritics.org/ (Oct. 19,
2006, 07:18 EST) (asserting hip-hop has “a particular beat and uses scratching and
‘breaks’” so all hip-hop might be rap but not all rap is hip-hop).

287

With Pandora, for example, users can create as many channels or stations as there are
artists. See Pandora Internet Radio, About Pandora, http://www.pandora.com/corporate/
(last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (stating that with Pandora, for example, users can create as
many channels or stations as there are artists).
288

See Raffi Zerounian, Bonneville International v. Peters, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47,
68-69 (2002), which argues:
AM/FM radio broadcasters have as their primary market, and
thus their primary concern, their “over-the-air listeners.” Airwaves
only reach a certain distance, which results in between 20 and 50 radio
stations in any particular geographic area. To survive, an AM/FM
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often tell what part of the country she is in by the music blasting through
her car speakers. As a result, radio listeners may have found themselves
deprived of the type of music for which they—not their neighbors—long
for.289 Again, not wanting to suffer through popular songs they do not
enjoy, listeners may instead choose a silent car ride. And if we truly want
to promote “useful Arts,” we should be concerned with songs that go
unheard because they are buried underneath the unrelated, more popular
bunch.
[84] Fourth, Internet radio has the potential to be more effective at
promoting artists and increasing music sales.290 The reality of digital
markets today is that any song purchase is potentially a click away. We
have all begged the radio DJ to tell us the name of that catchy song he
keeps playing during the day, only to find it stale the eighth time we hear
it, as he finally announces the title. Pandora, however, displays the artist
and song name, along with the album’s artwork.291 Choosing the song
takes you to information about the album, showing the rest of the tracks,

radio station must cater to a broad audience and receive revenue
through advertising, which results in stations having a wider variety of
music. Thus, a listener with a particular preference in music might
have to listen to music not of their choosing. Id.
289

See Newhouse, supra note 48, where Tim Westergren offers one listener’s experience
with Pandora:
Let me tell you that you are a blessing in my life. I’m 77
years old and the music I like and grew up with just isn’t played much
any more. Sometimes tears come to my eyes when I hear certain songs.
They bring back so many memories. I don’t think I have heard any
songs I haven’t liked. Thank you from the bottom of my heart. I send
you arms full of appreciation. Id.

290

See id. Tim Westergren claims that “[a]n August 2007 Nielsen/NetRatings research
study concluded that Pandora listeners are three to five time more likely to have
purchased music in the last 90 days than the average American.” Id. This conclusion has
been disputed by music record executives, although the report does not seem to be
publicly available.
291

See generally Pandora Radio, http://www.pandora.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
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and providing links to purchase the song immediately through either
iTunes or Amazon.com.292 Minimizing transaction costs for the listener
and making his buying experience more pleasant puts money in the
pockets of creators – just the type of incentives copyright law demands.
[85] Finally, individual webcasters have come up with their own unique
features that benefit the public and the artist. Pandora, for example, has
pioneered the “Music Genome Project.”293 As Tim Westergren, the
founder and Chief Strategy Officer of Pandora, describes it, a team of
university-degreed musicologists has worked to identify hundreds of
musical attributes in thousands of songs.294 When a user highlights the
songs he has enjoyed, commonalities trigger the next song, most often
performed by a different artist.295 If the listener does not like the new
song, he can inform Pandora, which then blacklists those attributes.296
Additionally, Pandora notes the tendencies of all its listeners and reflects
them in the choices it suggests to its users. As for the end-product,
Westergren puts it best:
The result is remarkable in many ways. More than
8.5 million registered Pandora listeners enjoy a better radio
experience, and they are passionate about our service.
They listen to more music, they re-engage with their music,
and they find new artists whose recordings they purchase
and whose performances they attend. Pandora is a bit of a
phenom – in only two years since our launch we have
become the third largest Internet radio service in America.

292

Id.

293

See R. Kayne, What Is the Music Genome Project?, WISEGEEK, July 26, 2009,
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-music-genome-project.htm (stating that the project
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But the real winners are music fans, artists, record
companies, songwriters and music publishers.297
Westergren also touts the sheer breadth of music examined by his team
and made available to the listeners.298 Each month Pandora catalogues
about 14,000 new songs that span across genres and range from the
obscure, amateur artists to the stars affiliated with major record labels.299
Unlike traditional broadcasters who play the “safer” song or, in some
cases, the one that has been bankrolled through the “payola system,”300
Pandora’s user-driven model ensures that songs are chosen based on their
musical relevance and merit.301 As a result, Westergren explains, more
than half of Pandora’s performances are from independent musicians,
compared to less than ten percent played by traditional radio.302
2. THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES
[86] The 2007 CRB decision would have cost Pandora $18 million of
an expected $25 million in revenue in 2008.303 Unchanged, the rates set
by the CRB would have led Tim Westergren, the founder of Pandora, to
pull the plug.304 And the Webcasters Settlement Act agreement will
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See id. In his testimony, Westergren was “proud to report” that seventy percent of the
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effectively keep webcasters in the same place they were in 2007—on the
brink of collapse.305
[87] To be sure, exposure of new artists and public access to music
alone should not trump proper compensation to copyright owners. Music
piracy achieves as much, and yet copyright law has rightly deemed it
illegal. Internet radio, however, is not the old Napster. In 2006 alone,
Pandora paid more than $2 million in royalties, and before the CRB
decision, it was on track to pay $4 million in 2007.306 Westergren has not
been begging Congress for a bailout or an exemption, he simply wants
reasonable rates that would make Internet radio economically
sustainable.307
[88] Why would the RIAA, through its royalty-collecting agent,
SoundExchange, seek to impose crushing royalties, potentially choking off
a growing revenue stream? One likely reason is that it wants to force
webcasters into license agreements where it could impose its own terms
for how they stream music.308 Another reason may be that the RIAA
wants “to cull the small and non-profit webcasters that offer more diverse
and esoteric content, while preserving the larger, more easily-controlled
players.”309 As economically rational as these reasons may be, they are,
nevertheless, in tension with the policy goals of copyright law.
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Kevin Fayle, Will the RIAA Kill Net Radio?, THE REGISTER, Mar. 30, 2007,
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3. LOOKING TO THE POLICY BEHIND
COPYRIGHT LAW TO FIND SOLUTIONS
[89] While the Internet Radio Equality Act (IREA) no longer has a
prospect of passing, it is useful to revisit the debate over the bill. The
force that blocked the IREA is the same one that is behind the high royalty
rates for webcasters: the legislators’ willingness to defer to a selfinterested party like the recording industry to determine how much money
it should take from webcasters without any regard for the significant
benefits that webcasters offer. From a policy standpoint, this is
indefensible. Even if the digital revolution has made the RIAA’s business
less profitable, it is an insufficient reason to impede the distribution of the
“useful Arts.”
[90] Westergren testified before Congress in 2007 partly to support the
IREA,310 when the bill was introduced in both chambers of Congress.311
IREA proposed several changes responding to the CRB’s 2007 decision,
the most interesting of which was doing away with the “willing buyer,
willing seller” standard in favor of the Copyright Act’s § 801(b) factors.312
As discussed earlier, these factors consider the distribution of works to the
public, the disruption to the industry, the relative value of the
contributions of the copyright holder and the service, and the fair rate of
return.313 Minding the public interest and the artist’s in preserving a new
way for him to communicate with the listener, these factors begin to
approach the general concerns of copyright law. Unfortunately, IREA
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59

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

died without hope of being resuscitated at the end of the 110th
Congress.314
[91] Nonetheless, the gap between the supporters and the opponents of
the IREA illustrate the larger rift in the current debate regarding Internet
radio. It is a rift neatly captured by David Oxenford in observing one of
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings regarding the bill:
Senator Wyden on behalf of the Internet Radio
Equality Act [stated] that it was necessary to avoid having
the high royalties decided by the Copyright Royalty Board
(CRB) destroy a fledgling technology, while Senator
Corker of Tennessee talked about the importance of music
to radio and the exhaustive process that the CRB had gone
through in arriving at the royalties that it approved. But in
the day's principal panel, the issues became crystal clear, as
John Simson of SoundExchange talked about the “vibrant”
business of Internet radio, citing an analyst's report that
Internet radio would be a $20 billion advertising market by
2020, and the statement of an employee of CBS that
Internet radio was a great business and that CBS was going
to “own it.” Speaking next, Joe Kennedy, CEO of Internet
radio company Pandora had a dramatically different
perspective – talking about an industry analyst who stated
that the royalties that would result from the CRB royalties
would exceed the revenue of the Internet Radio industry,
and that, for Pandora, the failure to find a compromise
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At least as indicated by their websites, the original sponsors, Senators Brownback and
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solution to the CRB-imposed royalties would mean that his
service would “die.”315
Put another way, the key question seems to be whether we are more
concerned about growing the pie or handing out the slices. Are we more
worried about nourishing Internet radio or maximizing the compensation it
can provide to musicians and record labels right away? As Oxenford’s
account illustrates, the two concerns have been in tension since at least the
2007 CRB decision. And with the settlement rates not having advanced
the ball much, coupled with a Congress that appears content to stay on the
sidelines, the tables are set for the debate to heat up in the near future.
[92] The law should weigh the benefit to the public and emerging artists
as much as, if not more than, the work contributed by the heavyweights of
the music industry and their artists. Therefore, using § 801(b)-like factors
would produce a fairer result—a result that fits with the general goals of
copyright law. To be sure, we can grow the pie while we cut it, and
anyone who had a part in creating a digital music performance does
deserve compensation. But we should be aware that the pie might shrink
if we cut it too quickly.
[93] The danger lies in allowing players in the music industry to
determine how large their portions ought to be. Indeed, its declining
revenue in the twenty-first century has made the RIAA, in particular,
greedier, more shortsighted, and unyielding. For instance, since the
imposition of the digital performance right, the RIAA has consistently
lobbied for unreasonable rates.316 It first asked Congress for a rate of 0.4
cents per a 2004 performance, which is five times larger than what the
2007 CRB decision set for 2006 performances.317 The same CRB decision

315

Posting of David Oxenford
broadcastlawblog.com/ (Aug. 5, 2008).
316

to

Broadcast

Law

Blog,

http://www.

See DelNero, supra note 71, at 200.

317

See id.; Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, http://www.
broadcastlawblog.com/ (Mar. 2, 2007).

61

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

that caused a stir among webcasters and Congress alike! As one
commentator concluded, when it came to dividing the new pie created by
Internet radio, the RIAA was more than just biased, it was unfair: “[T]he
recording industry’s request for unbridled power in establishing
webcasting rates bordered on the inequitable.”318 In the end, even as the
“fledgling [small] webcasters” were going out of business, the “politically
powerful” RIAA relented only after facing “an onslaught of intense
political pressure.”319
[94] There are other examples of the RIAA’s behavior which cast doubt
on the future alignment of its concerns with the underlying copyright law
policy. For instance, as Oxenford observes, the recording industry has
shown a degree of hypocrisy in fighting against the very standard (§
801(b)) that has kept the compulsory license under § 115—the ceiling for
what labels pay to reproduce compositions—at such a low rate.320 Also
telling is the way in which the RIAA bullied Congress into clarifying that
the digital performance right includes all webcasters: a congressional
debate was suppressed and a heavy burden on an emerging industry was
hastily imposed.321 By worrying mostly about supplanting the RIAA’s
318

DelNero, supra note 71, at 200. Even “[a]fter losing the compulsory license battle, the
RIAA did not retreat to a more reasonable position.” It “ultimately . . . agreed to a
percentage-of-revenue formula for small webcasters,” but only as a result of the political
pressure it faced. Id.
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Carey, supra note 42, at 271-72. As Carey explains:
In an effort to appease the RIAA, Congress permitted a lastminute hearing on the matter.” The prominent players in the equation
were hastily gathered in 1998. The Digital Media Association
(“DiMA”), digital media’s recently formed trade association,
represented webcasters. “On Thursday, July 23, 1998” the RIAA and
DiMA met with the U.S. Copyright Office . . . and were told by the
Register of Copyrights that they had until the following Friday, July 31,
1998, to draft the legislation that the RIAA was seeking. DiMA found
itself in a difficult position. Even if DiMA was able to defeat the
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declining revenue, Congress is remembering only one part of copyright
law’s equation. And to the extent that some artists benefit from Internet
radio’s promotional benefits, even that part of the equation needs to be
reconsidered.
[95] It is true that part of the RIAA’s struggles is directly attributable to
the digital revolution. Indeed, music piracy started to affect CD sales as
early as 1999 and probably continues to have some impact today.322
Although the RIAA and Congress may have been given a reason to tighten
up on webcasters because songs broadcasted over the Internet can be
“ripped,”323 piracy is not what SoundExchange focused on in its fight

legislative amendment proposed by the RIAA, it would still be subject
to the RIAA’s threatened litigation, which, at the very least would
impose a huge cost on the growing industry. “Therefore, instead of
fighting the amendment, DiMA negotiated a simpler compulsory
licensing process – paying royalties to a single entity, [eventually to
become SoundExchange] and not having to negotiate individually with
each individual copyright holder.” In somewhat miraculous fashion,
“on August 4, 1998, the House of Representatives passed an
amendment to the [DMCA] which included the legislation drafted and
agreed upon by the RIAA and DiMA just days, and perhaps hours,
earlier.” The “eleventh hour” amendment, made it into the DMCA
“without House or Senate debate,” and was signed into law by
President Clinton in October of 1998. Id.
322
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against the IREA or in its negotiations with webcasters. With music theft
from Internet radio vanishing as a major concern, there remains little
reason to demand more from the emerging industry, regardless of how
much potential it has, than from the more established mediums like
satellite radio and terrestrial broadcasting.324
CONCLUSION
[96] Just as 1999 was a turning point for the music industry and the
consumer, 2010 may be the year the two find themselves at a crossroads
once more. While Warner Music is testing the RIAA’s next great hope,
Choruss,325 and iTunes’s sales are climbing,326 Internet radio is currently
struggling for its survival, 2009 is setting the stage for landscape-altering
battles. But the war will not be won on business models alone; it will be
shaped by the RIAA’s old ally—copyright law.
[97] Ayn Rand once wrote that “one cannot give that which has not
been created. Creation comes before distribution—or there will be
nothing to distribute.”327 Regardless of how the RIAA tries to spin its
interest in collecting royalties, neither iTunes nor Pandora distribute at the
replacing CD sales, then the distinction between subscription and nonsubscription
webcaster services for purposes of the digital performance right – with the latter facing
the harsher standard – does not make sense; it seems that consumers who pay on a
subscription basis are more likely to replace CD sales with that service).
324
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expense of the creator. Just the opposite is true. The emerging digital
markets and Internet radio are a boon to the listener and artist alike. If
Congress admits as much, then copyright law demands legislative action
that imposes less onerous rates on webcasters and a fairer standard for
determining them in the future. It also demands that Choruss not be
looked on with favor.
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